Introduction
This study uses data from input-output tables and a methodology adopted from Corrado et al. (2009) to provide empirical evidence of the role of intangible capital in China according to industrial sector. In so doing, it offers a new methodology for measuring the role of intangible capital in a country where data on intangible capital are inadequate. It finds that growth in intangible capital explains almost 20 per cent of total factor productivity (TFP) growth in China over the period [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] . Moreover, these effects of intangible capital remain robust under various forms of sensitivity analysis including bootstrap regressions, the Levinsohn and Petrin (LP) (2003) approach and changes in the depreciation rate. At the sectoral level, we find that research and development (R&D), which embodies innovation, plays a more important role in agriculture than do economic competency or computerised information, but the role of economic competency is more important in the services and light-industry sectors than are R&D and computerised information.
China has enjoyed rapid growth since its reform and opening-up policies were implemented in 1978. China's real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in 1978 was only one-fortieth of the US level and one-tenth of the Brazilian level (Zhu 2012) . By 2015, however, China had real GDP per capita that was equal to almost one-quarter of the US level and at the same level as Brazil.
2 Growth in total factor productivity (TFP) has played a critical role in China's growth miracle. According to Zhu (2012) , positive change in TFP accounts for 78 per cent of the growth in China's GDP per capita between 1978 and 2007. The transition from 1 We much appreciate the helpful comments on earlier versions of this chapter from Ligang Song and the conference participants at the Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University. All remaining errors are our own. 2 GDP per capita is calculated using the purchasing power parity (PPP) approach (constant 2011 international currency); data are from the World Bank International Comparison Program (www.worldbank.org/en/ programs/icp). a planned to a market economy is a major source of TFP growth and has significantly improved China's TFP, but this source of TFP growth cannot last forever as returns from earlier reforms are diminishing.
From 2012, Chinese economic growth has been slowing and has entered a stage called the 'new normal', the official definition of which is that China will maintain stable and relatively lower growth compared with earlier growth rates. What could be China's new source of growth in the new normal? Text on the back of any iPhone may provide a hint. It reads: 'Designed by Apple in California. Assembled in China.' Payments to Chinese workers and the profits of non-Apple companies account for only 1.8 per cent and 9.2 per cent, respectively, of the value added of an iPhone, while Apple's profits are 58.5 per cent of the total value added in 2010, according to Kraemer et al. (2011) . This striking fact has an important implication: the distribution of value added in the global value chain favours those who own the product design and hold the market power, rather than those who manufacture the products.
Product design and market power embody a broader concept called intangibles ). Intangible capital consists of the stock of non-material resources that enter the production process and is important for the creation or improvement of products as well as production processes (Arrighetti et al. 2014) . Intangible capital has been playing an increasingly important role in boosting productivity and economic growth since the 'information technology revolution'. In developed economies, the relative use of tangible capital is decreasing while the relative use of intangible capital-such as production technologies, product design, market power and intangibles embodied in employees and firm structurehas been increasing (Fukao et al. 2009; van Ark et al. 2009; Marrano et al. 2009; Corrado and Hulten 2010; Miyagawa and Hisa 2013; Chun and Nadiri 2016) .
The literature on intangible capital is significant and includes the discussion of intangible capital as a source of growth in various countries at national and industry levels (Fukao et al. 2009; van Ark et al. 2009; Marrano et al. 2009; Corrado and Hulten 2010; Borgo et al. 2013; Corrado et al. 2013; Haskel and Wallis 2013; Miyagawa and Hisa 2013; Chun and Nadiri 2016) , the discussion of intangible capital in the valuation and productivity of firms (Atkeson and Kehoe 2005; Tronconi and Marzetti 2011; Arato and Yamada 2012; Papanikolaou 2013, 2014; Gourio and Rudanko 2014b; Clausen and Hirth 2016) and the discussion of incorporating intangible capital to solve macroeconomic puzzles Prescott 2010, 2014; Goodridge et al. 2013; Gourio and Rudanko 2014a) . However, studies on intangible capital in China are scarce, due both to the lack of data and to the recent importance of intangible capital to the economy. Hulten and Hao (2012) calculate the intangible capital of China between 2000 and 2008 and conduct growth accounting of national data using the income-share method. The authors gather only nine observations, which is not sufficient for a comprehensive analysis. Given China's shifting growth model and the possibility of utilising alternative data sources, it is timely to further investigate the role of intangible capital in China's growth.
To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first empirical test of how intangibles enhance economic growth at the sectoral level in China. In contrast to national-level studies, an industry-level study has the advantage of generating more observations and thus allows more statistical freedom to analyse how different categories of intangible capital impact on economic growth. This will provide a better way to assess the role of intangibles in an economy.
We divided 100 sectors from China's input-output tables for 1997, 2002, 2007 and 2012 3 into four subgroups-agriculture, light industry, heavy industry and services-to alleviate the problem of parameter heterogeneity between sectors. The selected input-output tables are constructed using data from China's National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), based on input-output surveys, and are relatively reliable. The measurement of intangible investment in this study follows the literature in capitalising either the intangible intermediates or intangible expenditure. Use of intermediates from input-output tables to estimate intangibles is common in the literature, 4 including in Miyagawa and Hisa (2013) , Haskel et al. (2014) and Chun and Nadiri (2016) .
Unlike Corrado et al. (2009 ), Fukao et al. (2009 and Hulten and Hao (2012) , however, this study uses a proxy approach-that is, we use the entries relevant to intangible investment as proxies and make the assumption that the ratios of intangible investments to the proxies remain constant over time. Using the proxy approach and assuming the ratio of true value to proxies is constant over time are also common in the literature on intangible capital. For example, Gourio and Rudanko (2014b) proxy selling, general and administrative expenses (S&GA) for investment in customer capital, while Tronconi and Marzetti (2011) and Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2014) proxy S&GA for investment in organisational capital. Although this assumption is often found to be invalid, it is the best this study could adopt based on the available data; and, if this assumption is true, the study will avoid the inaccurate measurement problems found in Corrado et al. (2009) and Fukao et al. (2009) .
When conducting growth accounting, we adopt the Cobb-Douglas parameter estimation based on econometrics instead of income/cost shares, along the lines of Niebel et al. (2017) . The advantage of this approach is to allow for the existence of error terms. In contrast, the income-share method used by Corrado et al. (2009 ), Fukao et al. (2009 and Hulten and Hao (2012) may underestimate the contribution of resource reallocation to economic growth when the economy is in disequilibrium, according to Nadiri (1970) . A transitional economy such as China's is likely to remain in disequilibrium over time; therefore, the income-share method is not suitable here. Our choice of econometric approach allows for an error term, which alleviates the problems arising from disequilibrium.
Our study also conducts bootstrap regressions to confirm the robustness of the results, which is new to the existing literature. Limited by the time span (T = 4), the standard generalised method of moments (GMM) approach is not suitable for this study. Bootstrap regressions are the only feasible method given data limitations. Studies on intangible capital often suffer from small sample size. Bootstrap regressions alleviate this problem to some extent. Moreover, the depreciation rate of intangible capital is debatable. To confirm the significance of the impacts of intangible capital, we will conduct a sensitivity analysis by experimenting with various depreciation rates.
This study consists of five sections. In the next section, the methodology of growth accounting at the industry level is discussed and a traditional growth accounting approach excluding intangible capital is conducted. Section three provides empirical evidence of the relationship between intangible capital and TFP. In section four, a growth accounting approach incorporating intangible capital is conducted, while section five concludes.
How do we conduct growth accounting with sectoral data?
Growth accounting often utilises the Cobb-Douglas production function (Equation 7.1).
.1, Y is GDP, A is TFP and K is capital. If the object is a nation, we take the logarithm of both sides and run a regression. The parameters ak and al can be estimated in this way. However, with sectoral data, there is a problem: the parameters of each industry may vary from one another. If a pooled regression is conducted, the heterogeneity of parameters will cause bias of the estimates. Moreover, each industry may have its own initial TFP value, which implies different intercepts of various industries. To overcome the problem of parameter heterogeneity, we categorise the industries according to the similarities of parameters, following previous literature such as Harris and Robinson (2002) . In this study, the subgroups are defined as follows: light industry, heavy industry, agriculture and services. 5 We then assume a Cobb-Douglas production function (Equation 7 .2).
Equation 7.2
Y it is the value added of sector i at time t; A it is the TFP of sector i at time t; K it is capital according to the traditional definition (excluding most intangibles); L it is the level of labour inputs; and ak and al are the capital and labour elasticities of output, respectively. Due to sectoral heterogeneity, the initial values of TFP may be different across sectors. We therefore assume Equation 7.3.
Taking the logarithm of both sides, we get Equation 7.4. lnY it = lnA it + ak lnk it = allnL it Equation 7.4 can be estimated by either the fixed-effects (FE) model or the randomeffects (RE) model, depending on whether A i0 varies from sector to sector within a subgroup.
A key issue in production function estimation is, however, correlation between the unobservable productivity shocks and input levels. An industry responds to positive productivity shocks by expanding output and input. Negative shocks lead an industry to reduce output and input usage. When true, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations of production functions are likely to be biased, which leads to biased estimates of productivity. Olley and Pakes (1996) develop an estimation approach using investment as a proxy for these unobservable shocks. More recently, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) point out that investment is lumpy. If this is true, the investment proxy may not respond smoothly to productivity shocks. Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) suggest that using intermediate inputs can solve this problem.
Therefore, here we also adopt growth accounting without intangibles 6 using the Levinsohn and Petrin (LP) approach. The proxy used in this study is the usage of electricity, heating, fuel and water intermediates at 1997 constant prices.
7
The growth rate of TFP is backed out as Equation 7.5.
Capital and labour inputs at the sectoral level as detailed as those in China's inputoutput tables are not available. Luckily, China's input-output tables have two variables: total wages for labour and capital depreciation. We adjust the nominated depreciation of capital to the real depreciation using the Price Index of Investment in Fixed Assets from the NBS.
We assume a constant depreciation rate, θ, as is the convention in the existing literature (Equation 7.6).
It is clear that real depreciation it has a strictly linear relationship with K it and therefore is a perfect proxy for capital. As for the quantity of labour, we have Equation 7.7.
Equation 7.7
Total wage it is from China's input-output table and average wage it is from the China Labour Statistical Yearbook (NBS various years); however, the sectoral classifications in these yearbooks are not as detailed as those in China's input-output tables. Therefore, the average wage in the upper level of classification is used as a proxy for the average wage in individual sectors.
It is clear that substituting the capital proxy (real depreciation it ) for K it is appropriate because the coefficient of real depreciation it is the same as that of K it . The depreciation rate, θ, becomes part of the intercept. The growth rate of K it that is used for the calculation of TFP is exactly the same as the growth rate of real depreciation it . Table 7 .1 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in regressions for the period 1998-2012. It is clear that the ranges of value added, capital proxy, labour and different categories of intangible capital are large. This sample consists of 100 sectors in China across 14 years and therefore has nearly 400 observations. 
(8)
(10) The results for growth accounting are displayed in 
Intangible capital and TFP growth
According to Corrado et al. (2009) , intangible investment includes investment in computerised information, innovative property and economic competency. Traditionally, intangible investment is classified as intermediate or expenditure and therefore is not manifest in national accounts. However, investment is the action of sacrificing today's consumption for increasing consumption in the future, according to Hulten (1979) and Corrado et al. (2009) . Moreover, the effects of the intangible expenditure mentioned above last more than one year and those expenses should therefore be capitalised.
We follow the literature to measure intangibles by capitalising the intangible intermediates or intangible expenditure. Specifically, this study obtains relevant intermediate data from China's input-output tables and assumes that the ratio of the intermediate to the true intangible investment remains constant over time.
The proxy approach is commonly adopted in measuring intangible investment and is well founded-for example, Gourio and Rudanko (2014b) proxy the S&GA for customer capital investment, and Tronconi and Marzetti (2011) and Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2014) proxy S&GA for organisational capital investment. Table 7 .3 presents our proxies for intangible investment. Following Corrado et al. (2009) , intangible investment is deflated to 1997 constant prices using the GDP deflator. 9 Since the interval of the input-output table is five years, we interpolate the missing data within the interval by assuming that the growth rate is constant within the five-year interval. The depreciation rate of intangible capital is set according to Corrado et al. (2009) : 20 per cent for R&D, 33 per cent for computerised information, 60 per cent for brand equity and 40 per cent for firmspecific resources. Based on these, we assume 40 per cent for overall intangibles and 50 per cent for economic competency intangibles. Intangible capital in 1997 was set to zero and therefore 1998 is the first year for which this study calculates intangible capital. According to Corrado et al. (2009) , the year in which initial capital stocks are zero has little effect on growth accounting analysis because the depreciation rates are high and much previous capital has been depreciated away by the date we start analysis-that is, 1998. Moreover, the amount of intangible capital in China was considerably smaller in the 1990s, as manifest by low R&D spending (0.57 per cent of GDP in 1996 10 and unavailable before that) and software use. Therefore, setting intangible capital in 1997 to zero will not cause significant problems.
9 The GDP deflator is obtained from the World Bank. 10 Data obtained from the World Bank. Table 7 .4 shows the trend of the sectoral average ratio of intangibles to tangibles. The amount of tangible capital is derived based on an assumed depreciation rate of 5 per cent. 11 The amount of intangible capital is calculated using the method explained above. Accompanying China's rapid economic growth over the past two decades has been a significant rise in its intangible-tangible ratio. However, compared with advanced economies, China's intensity of intangible capital use in production is still low and, therefore, there is plenty of room for catch-up in the future. For example, the intangible-tangible ratios of Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom in 2007 were 17 per cent, 22 per cent and 24 per cent, 12 respectively. Note that the parts of proxies include expenditure that is not intangible investment and excludes those that are produced within firms. This suggests that the actual intangible-tangible ratio might be lower or higher than the figures in Table 7 .4. Since TFP is the portion of output for which input cannot account (Comin 2004 ), we should be careful when linking TFP to intangible capital. Change in TFP is possibly caused by changes in human capital and institutional quality. The changes in human capital and institutions are often not sector-specific, which can be controlled for at the national level. To capture human capital and institutional quality changes, this study uses two proxies. The first is GDP per capita and the second is the time dummy that captures time effects. The positive correlation between economic development, human capital and institutional quality has been well documented (Weede and Kämpf 2002; Gwartney et al. 2004 ). The time dummy provides a different overall TFP growth rate for each year so we can separate the TFP growth at the national level from that caused by the change in intangible capital within individual industries. To control for the scale of an industry, the indicator of intangible capital is the ratio of intangibles to tangibles instead of the absolute amount of intangibles. Table 7 .5 demonstrates the relationship between the growth rate of TFP and the growth rate of the intangible-tangible ratio. Note two types of TFP are used to check the robustness of our results: one is derived from RE/FE models and the other is LP derived from the LP models. (7) OLS (8) RE (9) FE (10) OLS (11) Importantly, the growth rate of the intangible-tangible ratio is economically and statistically significant across all specifications. A 1 per cent increase in the intangibletangible ratio is associated with 0.26 per cent, 0.26 per cent, 0.31 per cent, 0.26 per cent, 0.26 per cent and 0.31 per cent growth in TFP according to models (1)- (6), respectively. A 1 per cent increase in the intangible-tangible ratio is associated with 0.14 per cent, 0.14 per cent, 0.16 per cent, 0.14 per cent, 0.14 per cent and 0.16 per cent growth in 'TFP, LP' according to models (7)- (12), respectively. Growth of the intangible-tangible ratio also explains a significant amount of TFP change, at 17 per cent according to model (4) and 11 per cent according to model (10). 13 The significant impact of intangibles on TFP is consistent with the findings of Haskel et al. (2014) , who regress TFP on intangibles, information and communication technology and other variables and find that intangible capital is the only one that is significant. With GDP per capita and time effects as the control variables and the fixed-effects estimator, the intangible-tangible ratio is still statistically and economically significant, which suggests the finding is robust. Based on the above evidence, we thus conclude that intangible capital does play a significant role in China's productivity increase.
Another interesting question to ask is how the contributions of different categories of intangible capital to TFP growth differ. Table 7 .6 shows the results of the effects of different intangible capital on TFP growth. When using the TFP derived from RE/FE models, all categories of intangible capital play important roles in the growth of TFP, being robust across all models. Specifically, according to model (4), a 1 per cent increase in the ratio of computerised information capital to tangible capital is associated with 0.08 per cent growth in TFP, 1 per cent growth in the ratio of R&D capital to tangible capital is associated with 0.11 per cent growth in TFP and 1 per cent growth in the ratio of economic competency capital to tangible capital is associated with 0.13 per cent growth in TFP. This is consistent with Chun et al. (2012) , who find that innovative property is the most significant among all sorts of intangible investments when they are used to explain the growth of TFP in the Japanese economy. However, when the method of deriving TFP changes from FE/RE models to LP models, the results differ. Although the scale of the coefficients has not changed dramatically, the statistical significance has. The computerised information capital is no longer significant and the economic competency capital is insignificant when year effects are not controlled. R&D capital remains generally significant. When it comes to the scale of the effects, according to model (8), a 1 per cent increase in the ratio of computerised information capital to tangible capital is associated with a 0.03 per cent increase in 'TFP, LP', a 1 per cent increase in the ratio of R&D capital to tangible capital is associated with a 0.04 per cent increase in 'TFP, LP' and a 1 per cent increase in the ratio of economic competency capital to tangible capital is associated with a 0.11 per cent increase in 'TFP, LP'. Cluster robust standard error is unavailable when using FE models due to insufficient rank, so FE models are not used. CI is computerised information (mainly software); R&D is innovative property; EC is economic competency; TFP denotes TFP derived from RE/FE models; while 'TFP, LP' is TFP derived from LP models. Number of id refers to the number of individuals within the sample.
Source: Authors' calculations.
Growth accounting incorporating intangible capital
According to Corrado et al. (2009) , the production function could be written as Equation 7.9 when intangible capital is incorporated.
.9, I is the intangible capital stock and ai is the output elasticity of intangible capital. When intangible expenditure is viewed as investment, it should be counted as value added according to its national accounts identity ). Therefore, when conducting growth accounting with intangible capital, an even more accurate measurement of intangible investment is required. In this study, however, we do not know the ratio of the true intangible investment to proxies. One feasible action is to assume 100 per cent as the base case.
14 Table 7 .7 demonstrates the results of growth accounting incorporating intangible capital. The impacts of intangibles on the economic growth of all subgroups are economically and statistically significant. A 1 per cent increase in intangible capital is associated with 0.16 per cent, 0.22 per cent, 0.14 per cent and 0.24 per cent output growth in agriculture, heavy industry, light industry and services, respectively. This indicates that intangible capital has become an important source of growth in the Chinese economy. .10, CI is computerised information (mainly software); RD is innovative property (R&D); EC is economic competency; and ai1, ai2 and ai3 are the output elasticities of the three inputs, respectively. Table 7 .8 shows the results of growth accounting using the above production function. Not all categories of intangible capital are significant (e.g. economic competency within the agricultural sector and R&D within the services sector). One reason might be the strong positive correlation between different categories of intangible capital due to their co-movement. However, from the results in Table 7 .8, we are able to obtain some information about the roles of different intangible capital in different industries. In agriculture, R&D is significant and positive. A 1 per cent increase in R&D capital is predicted to increase a sector's value added by 0.15 per cent. The coefficients of economic competency and computerised information are small, which may indicate that their effects are trivial. In heavy industry, all are economically and statistically significant. A 1 per cent increase in R&D, economic competency and computerised information is associated with 0.13 per cent, 0.11 per cent and 0.04 per cent growth in value added, respectively. In light industry, both R&D and economic competency capital are significant. A 1 per cent increase in R&D and economic competency is correlated with a 0.08 per cent and 0.14 per cent increase in value added, respectively. The coefficient of computerised information capital is insignificant and small. Therefore, economic competency capital is likely to play the most important role in China's light industry of the three categories of intangible capital. In services, only economic competency is significant. A 1 per cent increase in economic competency capital is associated with 0.25 per cent of value-added growth. The coefficients of both R&D and computerised information capital are insignificant and small in value, which may imply that economic competency is the most important category of intangible capital in the services sector. 
Conclusion
Intangible capital and its various forms-technology, product design, marketing and organisational development-are the foundation of knowledge economies. According to our results, China, a transitional economy, has started to benefit from the rapid growth of intangible capital. Using China's input-output tables for various years, this study provides an important insight into the role of intangible capital in different industries in the context of an emerging knowledge economy. It is specifically found that the growth in intangible capital is significantly associated with TFP growth in China, and explains almost 20 per cent of TFP growth over the sample period. The results are generally robust across the different model specifications.
This study also reveals the relative importance of different categories of intangible capital in different industries. In agriculture, R&D is likely to play a critical role, but the role of other intangible capital is relatively trivial. In the heavy-industry sector, R&D, computerised information (mainly software) and economic competency are all important to growth, but R&D is the most important. While the effects of both economic competency and R&D are significant to the growth of light industry, R&D is more significant. Last but not least, in the services sector, the role of economic competency is critical while those of the other categories are relatively unimportant. In other words, the role of R&D is important across all non-service industries, while the role of economic competency is paramount across all nonagriculture industries.
The use of intangible capital in production in China, however, remains relatively small compared with that in advanced economies. In 2007, the intangible-tangible ratio in China was approximately 3.4 per cent, compared with 17 per cent in Japan, 22 per cent in the United States and 24 per cent in the United Kingdom. This is consistent with China's role at the assembly end of global value chains and the fact that investment in design, intellectual property and branding remains the preserve of more developed economies. Given that the productivity boost from China's reform and opening up is diminishing and the country has entered the new normal phase, it is clearly time for China to invest in new sources of growth-and intangible capital is one of them.
The transformation from 'made in China' to 'designed in China' has a long way to run, but the shifts in the intangible-tangible ratio identified here suggest that China is catching up with frontier economies. Given the gradually increasing intangible capital in China, there is every reason to believe that rapid growth in intangible capital will become an increasingly important driver of China's economic growth.
